We told you so. You can’t trust Yasser

Arafat. He was never serious about peace.” So trumpet Israeli and American Jewish critics of the Oslo peace process, who feel that the recent Palestinian violence has vindicated their cynicism. “You can’t trust the Palestinians, who never really have wanted just the West Bank and Gaza — but Haifa and Tel Aviv, too! ”

If the only people making the “ trust” argument were those who never had much use for the peace process, it easily could be dismissed as a tool in a longstanding ideological war. But Israeli and American Jews who support a diplomatic solution also wonder whether Mr. Arafat is a suitable partner.

Now is the time for tough-minded centrists to repeat what was obvious to Yitzhak Rabin when he pursued the Oslo process: Trust in Mr. Arafat has little to do with it.

Even before the current conflagration, Prime Minister Barak and Israeli military intelligence experts knew that Mr. Arafat and his minions never relinquished violence as an option. The premise of the Oslo accords was to create circumstances that gave him and the Palestinian people a better option: a gradual, carefully managed, phased separation backed by the United States and international community that would eventually give them political independence in their own territory.

The fact that this option has been rejected for the moment is a tragedy for both peoples.

But for the sake of Israel’s security, it was — and is — still in Israel’s interest to keep alive the possibility of a negotiated separation. With threats from weapons of mass destruction and nuclear terrorism looming in Israel’s future, Rabin understood that the calculated risk of striving for a political arrangement with the Palestinians was outweighed by the much greater risk of letting the conflict fester. That logic still obtains.

A political process that relied on trust in Mr.Arafat would have given him a state with fixed borders a long time ago. Instead, Israel decided to give the Palestinians territory and political power little by little, while testing the willingness and ability of Mr. Arafat and his security forces to thwart terrorism and protect Israeli lives. The premise has always been that if they failed the test, Israel’s military would be able to step in and minimize the damage.

Israel has chosen do to so in a restrained fashion thus far, although a more forceful response may be necessary.

Israeli lives been lost since that handshake on the White House lawn.

But even as the current violence rages, we must remember that many more lives almost certainly would have been lost— through outright war, more terror or a never-ending intifada — if the Oslo accords had not been reached.

Veterans of Israel’s domestic intelligence service, the Shin Bet, who have spent their lives fighting terrorism, will tell you that a significant number of lives had been saved before the recent outbreak of violence by security cooperation with the Palestinian Authority, and that this largely went unreported in the press.

Despite a number of horrific attacks during that period, and despite the recent violence, as a result of this Israeli Palestinian cooperation fewer Israelis were victims of terror in the last two years than in any year since 1967.

Hamas, which wants more terrorism and more Israeli deaths, is praying that this security cooperation will be ruptured permanently by the current “uprising.” Those who want that security dialogue to be renewed know that some kind of political dialogue is essential.

It is clear that certain processes and timetables envisioned by the signers of the Oslo accords are no longer relevant. Mr. Arafat and the Palestinians once again have shot themselves in their collective foot. Offered the chance to realize many of their aspirations through negotiations, they have opted for a low level war that will create more obstacles to those aspirations.

If and when they are ready to stop this war, a return to the status quo ante is impossible. Israel will require a new set of principles and new, tough, more stringent security arrangements. Israeli security officials reportedly are exploring new mechanisms that will give their Palestinian counterparts even less leeway and freedom to operate independently. That will probably be necessary whether or not the Israeli government decides to separate from the disputed territories unilaterally, an option that Mr. Barak is said to be considering.

But the two peoples must find a way to coexist in different territories. Ultimately, a negotiated, political arrangement will be the most likely to insure a modicum of stability. If it takes years or even decades for Palestinian leaders to understand that, then so be it. In the meantime, proponents of the goals of Oslo must keep their eyes on the prize. The only alternative is more of what we have witnessed during the past seven weeks, and quite possibly much worse.